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Art & the “Public Trust” in Municipal
Bankruptcy
BRIAN L. FRYE *
ABSTRACT
In 2013, the City of Detroit filed the largest municipal bankruptcy
action in United States history, affecting about $20 billion in municipal
debt. Unusually, Detroit owned its municipal art museum, the Detroit
Institute of Arts (“DIA”) and all of the works of art in the DIA collection,
which were potentially worth billions of dollars. Detroit’s creditors wanted
Detroit to sell the DIA art in order to satisfy its debts. Key to the
confirmation of Detroit’s plan of adjustment was the DIA settlement, under
which Detroit agreed to sell the DIA art to the DIA corporation in exchange
for $816 million over 20 years.
The bankruptcy court approved the DIA settlement as fair and in the
best interests of the creditors because it found that Detroit could not, would
not, and should not sell the DIA art. The bankruptcy court’s conclusion
that Detroit could not sell the DIA art was wrong. It could and did sell the
DIA art. But the bankruptcy court’s effective conclusion that Detroit was
free to sell the DIA art on its own terms was correct.
The Detroit bankruptcy and DIA settlement suggest that art museums
should be permitted and even encouraged to sell works of art in order to
preserve the rest of their collections and continue operations. Professional
standards that prohibit art museums from selling works of art for any
purpose other than purchasing works of art are unjustified and should be
abandoned.
INTRODUCTION
On July 18, 2013, the City of Detroit, Michigan filed for municipal
bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. It was the largest
municipal bankruptcy filing in United States history, affecting about $20
billion in municipal debt to pensioners and bondholders.
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During the bankruptcy proceedings, Detroit proposed several draft
plans of adjustment, which increasing numbers of its creditors accepted.
Ultimately, the bankruptcy court had to decide whether to approve
Detroit’s final plan of adjustment, which the overwhelming majority of its
creditors had accepted. Among other things, the bankruptcy court
considered whether Detroit could and should sell certain works of art that it
owned in order to satisfy its creditors.
Unlike most cities, Detroit owned its municipal art museum, the
Detroit Institute of Arts (“DIA”), and all of the works of art in the DIA
collection, which were potentially worth billions of dollars. Detroit’s
creditors argued that that the DIA art was a non-core asset that could and
should be liquidated in bankruptcy. The DIA corporation and the Michigan
Attorney General argued that Detroit could not sell the DIA art, because it
owned the art subject to the public trust, a charitable trust, and gift
restrictions specific to particular works of art.
While Detroit initially considered selling the DIA art, ultimately it
argued that it could not, and should not, sell the DIA art. Detroit’s final
plan of adjustment included the “DIA Settlement” or “Grand Bargain,”
under which Detroit would transfer the DIA art to the DIA corporation, in
exchange for contributions of $816 million over twenty years from the DIA
corporation and other charities, which would be used to partially satisfy
Detroit’s debt to its pensioners.
The bankruptcy court confirmed Detroit’s final plan of adjustment,
including the DIA settlement. It concluded that the DIA settlement was
fair and in the best interest of the creditors, because Detroit could not,
would not, and should not sell the DIA. First, the court found that Detroit
could not sell the DIA art, listing the arguments advanced by the DIA
corporation and the Michigan Attorney General, but not identifying a
specific basis for its finding. Second, the court found that Detroit would
not sell the DIA art, and that it lacked the authority to force Detroit to sell
the DIA art. Third, the court found that Detroit should not sell the DIA art,
because the DIA was necessary to Detroit’s economic recovery.
The court’s finding that Detroit could not sell the DIA art was
incorrect on the facts and the law. Detroit owned most or all of the DIA art
outright, not subject to the public trust, a charitable trust, or gift
restrictions. Nothing prevented Detroit from selling some or all of the DIA
art. Indeed, not only did the court implicitly acknowledge that Detroit
could sell works of art from the DIA collection in order to purchase other
works of art, but also the DIA settlement literally amounted to the sale of
the DIA art to the DIA corporation.
However, the court correctly found that the DIA settlement was fair
and in the best interests of the creditors. Because creditors had not relied
on the DIA art as collateral, the court could not force Detroit to sell the
DIA art, and Detroit reasonably believed that preserving the DIA collection
was necessary to its economic recovery. Accordingly, the DIA settlement
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and Detroit’s final plan of adjustment provided the largest recovery that the
creditors could reasonably expect under the circumstances, and was better
than the only alternative, which was rejection of the plan of adjustment.
Detroit correctly decided to sell the DIA art to the DIA corporation in
order to ensure that it could satisfy its obligations to its pensioners. But
professional standards prevent most art museums from making the same
decision. That is wrong. The Detroit bankruptcy and the DIA settlement
support the conclusion that art museums should be permitted, and even
required, to sell works of art when necessary to continue operations.
MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY UNDER CHAPTER 9 OF THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code allows “municipalities” to file for
bankruptcy under certain circumstances. 1 Congress first enacted municipal
bankruptcy legislation in 1934, but the Supreme Court held that the 1934
Act was unconstitutional because it exceeded the authority granted to
Congress by the Bankruptcy Clause by violating state sovereignty as
Congress enacted revised
guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment. 2
municipal bankruptcy legislation in 1937, and the Supreme Court held that
the 1937 Act was constitutional because it required the consent of the state
and the majority of the creditors. 3 And in 1942, the Supreme Court held
that states could compel unwilling creditors to join a plan of adjustment of
municipal debts. 4
While Chapter 9 has existed for quite some time, municipal
bankruptcies are relatively rare. Fewer than 700 municipalities have filed
bankruptcy petitions under Chapter 9 since it was enacted in 1937. By
comparison, in 2016 alone there were 523,394 bankruptcy petitions filed
under Chapter 7, 7,380 bankruptcy petitions filed under Chapter 11, and
302,193 bankruptcy petitions filed under Chapter 13. 5 Moreover, the
overwhelming majority of municipalities that have filed for bankruptcy
under Chapter 9 are special tax districts, municipal utilities, and small
towns that have not issued public debt. As a consequence, much of the law
governing municipal bankruptcy is sparse and undeveloped. 6
I.

*
11 U.S.C. §§ 901-46 (2012).
2. Pub. L. No. 251, 48 Stat. 798 (1934); See Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water
Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
3. Pub. L. No. 302, 50 Stat. 653 (1937); United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
Bekins is generally understood to have overruled Ashton sub rosa, insofar as Ashton held
that a state could not consent to federal infringement of its sovereignty under the
Bankruptcy Clause, and Bekins held that it could. Id. at 41-43.
4. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
5. See Report F-5A, U.S. Bankruptcy Court (Mar. 31, 2016),
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/f-5a/bankruptcy-filings/2016/03/31.
6. See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic
Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281 (2012).
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A. Eligibility for Bankruptcy Protection Under Chapter 9
Under the Bankruptcy Code, only a “municipality” can file for
The Bankruptcy Act defines a
bankruptcy under Chapter 9. 7
“municipality” quite broadly as a “political subdivision or public agency or
instrumentality of a State.” 8 As a result, the entities eligible to file for
bankruptcy under Chapter 9 include cities, counties, townships, school
districts, and public improvement districts, as well as fee-based public
entities like bridge authorities, highway authorities, and gas authorities.
While only municipalities can file for bankruptcies under Chapter 9,
municipalities cannot file for bankruptcy under any other chapter of the
Bankruptcy Code. 9
A municipality is eligible to file a bankruptcy petition under Chapter 9
only if: (1) it is authorized by the state to file for bankruptcy; (2) it is
insolvent; (3) it wants to adjust its debts; and (4) it has either negotiated a
plan to adjust its debts or cannot negotiate such a plan. 10 These eligibility
requirements can complicate municipal bankruptcy filings, and can prevent
some municipalities from filing for bankruptcy.
First, a municipality is eligible to file for bankruptcy only if it “is
specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a
debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or
organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a

7. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(1) (2012) (“An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of
this title if and only if such entity . . . is a municipality”).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2012).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2012) (“The term ‘person’ includes individual, partnership,
and corporation, but does not include governmental unit.”).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012) provides:
An entity may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title if and only if such entity—
(1) is a municipality;
(2) is specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a
debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or
organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under
such chapter;
(3) is insolvent;
(4) desires to effect a plan to adjust such debts; and
(5) (A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in
amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan
in a case under such chapter;
(B) has negotiated in good faith with creditors and has failed to obtain the
agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of each
class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a case under such chapter;
(C) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is impracticable;
or
(D) reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer that is
avoidable under section 547 of this title.
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debtor under such chapter.” 11 Fifteen states have authorized municipalities
to file for bankruptcy on their own initiative. 12 Most states, including
Michigan, require municipalities to obtain explicit authorization to file for
bankruptcy. 13 Only Georgia prohibits municipalities from filing for
bankruptcy. 14
Second, a municipality is eligible to file for bankruptcy only if it is
“insolvent.” 15 Under the Bankruptcy Act, a private debtor is “insolvent”
and eligible to file for bankruptcy if its debts exceed its assets.16 By
contrast, a municipal debtor is “insolvent” only if it is: (1) “generally not
paying its debts as they become due unless such debts are the subject of a
bona fide dispute” or (2) “unable to pay its debts as they become due.”17
Effectively, a municipality is “insolvent” and eligible to file for bankruptcy
under Chapter 9 only if it cannot raise taxes or borrow in order to pay its
As a consequence, only the most financially distressed
debts. 18
municipalities are eligible to file for bankruptcy.
Third, a municipality is eligible for bankruptcy only if it “desires to
effect a plan to adjust such debts.” 19 In other words, unlike private debtors,
municipalities must choose to file for bankruptcy, and cannot be forced into
bankruptcy.
And finally, a municipality is eligible for bankruptcy only if it:
(A) has obtained the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority
in amount of the claims of each class that such entity intends to impair
under a plan in a case under such chapter . . . ;
(B) has negotiated in good faith with creditors and has failed to obtain
the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the
claims of each class that such entity intends to impair under a plan in a
case under such chapter . . . ;

11. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012).
12. Those states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas and
Washington. John Gramlich, Municipal Bankruptcy Explained: What it Means to File for
Chapter
9,
The
Pew
Charitable
Trusts,
November
22,
2011,
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2011/11/22/municipalbankruptcy-explained-what-it-means-to-file-for-chapter-9.
13. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 141.1558 (2012).
14. See Ga. Code Ann. § 36-80-5 (2010).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (2016).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) and (B) (2016).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (2016).
18. Se,e e.g., In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(4) (2016) and 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2016) (“An involuntary
case may be commenced only under chapter 7 or 11 of this title, and only against a person,
except a farmer, family farmer, or a corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or
commercial corporation, that may be a debtor under the chapter under which such case is
commenced.”).
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(C) is unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation is
impracticable; or
(D) reasonably believes that a creditor may attempt to obtain a transfer
20
that is avoidable under section 547 of this title. . . .

Essentially, in order to file for bankruptcy, a municipality must show
that it has negotiated a plan of adjustment with the majority of its creditors,
has tried and failed to negotiate a plan of adjustment, effectively cannot
negotiate a plan of adjustment, or reasonably believes that a plan of
adjustment will prevent inequitable treatment of its creditors.
B. The Authority of the Bankruptcy Court Under Chapter 9
The authority of a bankruptcy court hearing a municipal bankruptcy
action under Chapter 9 is considerably more limited than under other
chapters of the Bankruptcy Act. Under other chapters of the Bankruptcy
Act, the bankruptcy court can make certain financial decisions on behalf of
the debtor during bankruptcy proceedings and can force the debtor to
liquidate or accept a plan of reorganization.21 By contrast, under Chapter
9, the bankruptcy court cannot make financial decisions on behalf of the
municipal debtor and cannot force a municipal debtor to accept a plan of
adjustment. 22
As a consequence, the formal powers of a bankruptcy court hearing a
municipal bankruptcy action under Chapter 9 are essentially limited to: (1)
determining whether the municipality is eligible to file for bankruptcy; (2)
overseeing the handling of executory contracts, including collective
bargaining agreements; and (3) approving or denying the municipality’s
proposed plan of adjustment. 23 But the court’s formal powers enable it to
exert considerable informal power over the bankruptcy action. The
primary source of the court’s informal power derives from its formal power
to approve or deny the municipality’s proposed plan of adjustment. As a
consequence, the court can exert informal power over the municipality by
threatening to deny the plan of adjustment, and can exert informal power
over the creditors by threatening to approve the plan of adjustment. In
practice, this informal power ideally enables the court to mediate disputes
among the municipality and its creditors and to help them reach a
settlement.

20. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5) (2016).
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2016) (Involuntary cases); 11 U.S.C. §§ 361-66
(Administrative Powers).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2016) (Involuntary cases); 11 U.S.C. § 904 (Limitation on
jurisdiction and powers of court).
23. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-46 (2012).
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C. The Rights of the Creditors Under Chapter 9
The rights of the creditors in a municipal bankruptcy action under
Chapter 9 are also considerably more limited than under other chapters of
the Bankruptcy Act. Under other chapters of the Bankruptcy Act, creditors
may commence an involuntary bankruptcy action and may file a plan of
reorganization. 24 By contrast, under Chapter 9, creditors of a municipal
debtor cannot commence an involuntary bankruptcy action and cannot file
a plan of reorganization. 25
Chapter 9 protects creditors in several different ways. First, it adopts
the Chapter 11 requirement that at least one class of impaired creditors
must accept the plan. 26 And second, it adopts the Chapter 11 treatment of
secured creditors, providing that they are entitled to receive at least the
value of the property securing their claims. 27 Under Chapter 9, this ensures
that creditors with claims secured by particular revenue streams are entitled
to the value of those revenue streams. These provisions are intended to
ensure that at least some impaired creditors have received fair treatment
under the plan of adjustment, and that the municipality cannot collude with
junior creditors to the detriment of senior creditors. 28
But Chapter 9 protects creditors primarily by requiring that the court
determine that “the plan is in the best interests of creditors and is
feasible.” 29 Courts have typically held that a plan of adjustment is “in the
best interest of creditors” if it provides creditors with the best recovery that
they can reasonably expect under the circumstances, and that it is
“feasible” if the municipal debtor can actually execute the plan. 30 As a
consequence, the court should approve a proposed plan of adjustment only
if it provides a reasonable recovery to all of the creditors, depending on
their respective circumstances, and the municipality can actually provide
the recovery that it promises in the plan.
This provision enables a bankruptcy court to exert pressure on both
the municipality and the creditors to reach a settlement. The court can

24. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2016) (Involuntary cases); 11 U.S.C. §§ 361-66
(Administrative Powers); 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2000) (Who may file a plan).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2016) (Involuntary cases); 11 U.S.C. § 904 (Limitation on
jurisdiction and powers of court); 11 U.S.C. § 941 (2012) (Filing of plan).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2000)).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2012)).
28. But see Stephen J. Lubben, The Overstated Absolute Priority Rule (Mar. 20,
2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that there is not, cannot, and
should not be an “absolute priority rule” in bankruptcy).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012). See also Matthew Bruckner, The Virtue in
Bankruptcy, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 233, 236 & nn.10-12 (2013).
30. See, e.g., In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 454 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999)
(finding plan of adjustment “in the best interests of creditors” because obtaining additional
tax revenue to support a hospital district was not possible) and Kane v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 649 (2d Cir. 1988).
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exert pressure on the municipality by threatening not to confirm its
proposed plan of adjustment, and can exert pressure on the creditors by
threatening to confirm the municipality’s proposed plan of adjustment. But
in practice, the court has more leverage over the creditors than the
municipality, because it can force the creditors to accept a plan, but cannot
force the municipality to adopt a plan. And the social benefits of approving
a plan that provides a suboptimal recovery to the creditors typically exceed
the social costs. As a consequence, while a bankruptcy court could
theoretically refuse to approve a plan of adjustment that provided a
suboptimal recovery to the creditors, in practice it provides an incentive for
the court to approve a reasonable plan of adjustment, and enables
municipal debtors to obtain bankruptcy protection on more favorable terms
than non-municipal debtors. 31 Moreover, the court must consider whether
a plan that provides a suboptimal return to the creditors still provides a
better return than the creditors could expect in case the plan was rejected.
II. THE DETROIT BANKRUPTCY
In April 2012, after decades of gradual economic decline, the City of
Detroit faced an acute financial crisis, precipitated by former Mayor
Kwame Kilpatrick’s decision to issue $1.4 billion in risky and possibly
illegal pension obligation certificates-of-participation and corresponding
interest rate swaps, which were secured by Detroit’s casino tax revenue.
Mayor David Bing and the City Council entered a consent agreement with
the State of Michigan to implement certain reforms in exchange for
financial assistance. When Detroit missed several deadlines and failed to
meet certain benchmarks, the State of Michigan appointed an independent
financial review team. On February 19, 2013, the financial review team
released its report, which found that Detroit faced a financial emergency it
had “no satisfactory plan” to address. 32
Based on the report, Michigan took control of Detroit’s finances. On
March 14, 2013, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder declared a financial
emergency. On March 15, 2013, the Local Emergency Financial
Assistance Loan Board appointed Kevyn Orr the Emergency Financial
Manager of the City of Detroit, pursuant to Public Act 72 of 1990 of the
State of Michigan, also known as the Local Government Fiscal
Responsibility Act, and Orr took office on March 25, 2013. 33 On March
28, 2013, Public Act 72 was repealed by referendum, but it was quickly
replaced by Public Act 436, which restored Orr’s authority. 34
31. In theory, this benefit is offset by the burden of obtaining permission to file for
bankruptcy and the more stringent standard for showing insolvency under Chapter 9.
32. DETROIT FINANCIAL REVIEW TEAM, REPORT OF THE DETROIT FINANCIAL REVIEW
TEAM (Feb. 19, 2013).
33. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 141.1201-141.1291 (repealed 2013).
34. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 141.1542(e), 141.1571 (2013).
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A. The Bankruptcy Court’s Initial Decisions
On July 16, 2013, Orr recommended that Detroit file for municipal
bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. And on July 18,
2013, Governor Snyder authorized Detroit to file for bankruptcy, satisfying
the first condition for a municipal bankruptcy action under Chapter 9, that a
municipality be “specifically authorized” by the state to file for
bankruptcy. 35 Detroit immediately filed a Voluntary Petition for the City
of Detroit, Michigan, commencing a municipal bankruptcy action. At that
point, Detroit had about $20 billion in outstanding debt, making its
bankruptcy filing the largest municipal bankruptcy filing to date.
Unsurprisingly, the bankruptcy court found that Detroit was
“insolvent” and therefore qualified to be a debtor under Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code, as its debts far exceeded its revenue and raising
additional revenue was impossible. 36 On August 2, 2013, the bankruptcy
court required Detroit to file a plan of adjustment on or before March 1,
2014. 37 Between February 21, 2014 and August 20, 2014, Detroit filed
seven proposed plans of adjustment. 38 And on May 12, 2014, Detroit
began soliciting formal acceptance of its final plan of adjustment by its
various classes of creditors. Ultimately, the overwhelming majority of
Detroit’s creditors accepted the plan, including most of its impaired
creditors.
Detroit’s most substantial creditors were:
• UBS and Bank of America Merrill Lynch, which owned the
secured interest rate swaps;
• The City’s pensioners, who were entitled to pension and
medical benefits; and
• Syncora and Financial Guaranty Insurance Company
(“FGIC”), which owned hundreds of millions of dollars of
unsecured debt.
First, UBS and Bank of America Merrill Lynch settled with the
Detroit for a fraction of the value of their secured claims, after the
35. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2016).
36. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 190-91 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).
37. First Order Establishing Dates and Deadlines, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. Aug. 2, 2013) (No. 13-53846), ECF No. 700.
38. Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit, In re City of Detroit, 504
B.R. 97 (Feb. 21, 2014); Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit,
In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Mar. 31, 2014); Second Amended Plan for the
Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit, In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, (Apr.16,
2014); Third Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit, In re City of
Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Apr. 25, 2014); Fourth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of
the City of Detroit, In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (May 5, 2014;) Corrected Fifth
Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit, In re City of Detroit, 504
B.R. 97 (July 29, 2014); and Sixth Amended Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of
Detroit, In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Aug. 20, 2014).
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bankruptcy court repeatedly rejected Detroit’s proposed settlements on the
ground that claims were based on debt that may have been illegally issued.
Then, the pensioners settled with Detroit, after the DIA settlement enabled
Detroit to offer them almost all of their pension benefits, and a small
percentage of their medical benefits. And finally, Syncora and FGIC
settled with Detroit when they realized that the bankruptcy court would
approve the final plan of adjustment with or without their consent.
Ultimately, only a few creditors objected to Detroit’s final plan of
adjustment. 39
B. The DIA Settlement
The key to the resolution of the Detroit bankruptcy was the DIA
settlement, which enabled Detroit to obtain the consent of its pensioners.
Initially, when Detroit realized that it owned the DIA art and that the DIA
art was worth billions of dollars, it considered selling the DIA art, in order
to satisfy its creditors. The DIA corporation vigorously opposed any sales,
arguing that Detroit could not sell the DIA art, because it owned the DIA
art subject to the public trust, a charitable trust, and various gift restrictions
specific to particular works of art. And on June 13, 2013, the Attorney
General of Michigan issued an opinion stating that Detroit could not sell
the DIA art, because it owned the DIA art subject to a charitable trust. 40
Essentially, the Attorney General opined that the Detroit Museum of Art
(“DMA”) was formed as a charitable trust, that it conveyed its collection to
Detroit subject to a charitable trust, and that Detroit therefore owned the
DIA art subject to a charitable trust. 41
But Detroit’s principal creditors disagreed. Detroit’s pensioners
wanted to recover the full value of their pensions, even if it meant selling
the DIA art. And Syncora and FGIC made common cause with the
pensioners, realizing that the DIA art was the most valuable asset owned by
Detroit. The DIA corporation was appalled by the prospect of Detroit
selling any of the DIA art in order to pay its creditors, as were other art
museums, professional organizations of art museums and museum
directors, and charitable foundations affiliated with art museums. But
Detroit’s pensioners and creditors did not care, and considered the DIA art
an asset like any other.
In order to resolve the dispute, Detroit and the DIA corporation
entered into mediation, supervised by Judge Gerald Rosen. The primary
purpose of the mediation was to reach an agreement between Detroit and
the DIA corporation that would enable Detroit to form a settlement
39. See generally NATHAN BOMEY, DETROIT RESURRECTED: TO BANKRUPTCY AND
BACK (2016).
40. Conveyance or Transfer of Detroit Institute of Arts Collection, Op. Att’y Gen. No.
7272, available at http://www.ag.state.mi.us/opinion/datafiles/2010s/op10351.htm.
41. Id.
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agreement with its pensioners. Judge Rosen observed that while Detroit’s
aggregate obligation to its pensioners was enormous, the individual claims
were relatively modest. As a result, any reduction of the pension claims
would impose serious hardships on individual pensioners.
Judge Rosen’s solution was to ask the DIA corporation and a
congeries of charitable foundations to effectively purchase the DIA art
from Detroit for a fraction of its market value, but a sum sufficient to
satisfy Detroit’s pensioners. The settlement negotiated by Judge Rosen
provided that the City would transfer the DIA art to the DIA corporation, in
exchange for contributions of $816 million over twenty years from the DIA
corporation and other charities and the State of Michigan. Specifically, it
provided that:
• The DIA would secure and guarantee commitments for
contributions to the General Retirement System and the Police
and Fire Retirement System of $100 million over 20 years.
• Various local and national charitable foundations, including
the Ford, Kresge, and Knight foundations would contribute
$366 million to the General Retirement System and Police and
Fire Retirement System over 20 years.
• The State of Michigan would contribute $350 million to the
General Retirement System and Police and Fire Retirement
System over 20 years.
• The City would transfer the art to the DIA Corp., which will
hold the art in a perpetual charitable trust for the benefit of the
people of the City and the State. 42
The DIA settlement negotiated by Judge Rosen became known as the
“Grand Bargain” because it enabled Detroit to satisfy both the DIA
corporation and its pensioners. Under the DIA settlement, the DIA
corporation acquired all of the DIA art, in exchange for enough money to
enable Detroit to pay its pensioners almost the full value of their claims.
As a result, the DIA settlement enabled Detroit to both preserve the DIA
collection in Detroit and settle with its pensioners, who might have been
able to present confirmation of Detroit’s plan of adjustment if they were
sufficiently dissatisfied with Detroit’s offer. However, Detroit was not
obligated to agree to the DIA settlement, and could have refused to sell the
DIA art or sold the DIA art on the open market.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DETROIT INSTITUTE OF ART
The historical record shows that the city owned most or all of the DIA
art outright, not subject to the public trust, a private charitable trust, or gift
restrictions. The public trust doctrine is irrelevant, as it does not and

42. Oral Opinion on the Record, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 7,
2014) (No. 13-53846).
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should not apply to works of art. Detroit did not own the DIA art subject to
a charitable trust, as it purchased some of the DIA art from a charitable
corporation via an unconditional bill of sale, purchased some of the DIA art
with its own funds, and received some of the DIA art via unconditional
gifts. While Detroit received a few of the works of art in the DIA
collection subject to limited gift restrictions, it owned the overwhelming
majority of the DIA art outright. Moreover, Detroit repeatedly and
explicitly rejected efforts to impose trust and gift restrictions on its
ownership of the DIA art.
A. The Creation of the Detroit Museum of Art
In 1881, James E. Scripps, the publisher of The Detroit News,
embarked on a five-month European tour. When he returned, The Detroit
News published a series of columns in which Scripps described the art and
culture of Italy, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. The columns were
popular, so Scripps revised and republished them as a book in 1882. 43 In
1883, William H. Brearley, the manager of The Detroit News advertising
department, organized an art exhibit inspired by Scripps’s book, which was
also popular.
Based on the success of the book and exhibit, Scripps and Brearley
decided to establish an art museum. Scripps pledged to contribute $50,000
to the museum, and asked forty prominent Detroit businessmen to
contribute at least $1,000 each.
On February 16, 1885, the Michigan Legislature passed “An act for
the formation of corporations for the cultivation of art.” 44 The 1885 Act
authorized the formation of private, nonprofit corporations for the purpose
of collecting and exhibiting works of art, with certain conditions:
Such corporations shall have power to acquire and hold such real estate
as is suitable for the site of such art buildings as it may erect or maintain
thereon, to receive and use such gifts, contributions, devises, and
bequests as may be made to it for art purposes; to receive, acquire,
collect, and own paintings, sculpture, engravings, drawings, pictures,
coins, and other works of art and to institute, maintain, or assist schools
for the teaching of art.
The public exhibition of its collection of works of art shall be the duty
of every such corporation, and, as soon as it shall be prepared to do so,
it shall, under reasonable regulations, and without any improper
discriminations, open its building and art collections to the general
public.
...

43. JAMES E. SCRIPPS, FIVE MONTHS ABROAD,
EXPERIENCES OF AN EDITOR IN EUROPE (1882).
44. 1885 Mich. Pub. Acts 3.
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All gifts, devises, or bequests made to any such corporation, and all its
income, shall be faithfully used for the purposes for which the
corporation was organized; and no dividend in money or property shall
ever be made by such corporation among its members.
The character and purposes of such corporation shall not be changed,
nor its general art collection be sold, incumbered, or disposed of, unless
authorized by the legislature of this state upon the concurrent request of
said corporation, and of the mayor and board of aldermen of the city in
which it is situated. But if any such corporation should ever cease, be
diverted from the lawful purposes of its organization, or become unable
usefully to serve such purposes, the legislature may by law provide for
the winding up of its affairs and for the conservation and disposition of
the property in such way as may best promote and perpetuate, in the city
where it is situated, the purposes for which such corporation was
45
originally organized.

On April 16, 1885, the DMA was incorporated under the 1885 Act by
40 members, each of whom contributed at least $1000. Among other
things, its articles of incorporation provided:
Said corporation is formed for the objects and purposes contemplated
by the act above mentioned, to wit, for the founding of a public art
institute in the City of Detroit, which may acquire and hold such real
estate as may be suitable for the site of such art buildings as it may erect
or maintain thereon; receive and use such gifts, contributions, devises
and bequests, as may be made it for art purposes; receive, acquire,
collect and own paintings, sculpture, engravings, drawings, pictures,
coins and other works of art, and may institute, maintain or assist
schools for the teaching of art, and may do all other things authorized
by said act, and have and enjoy all the privileges and franchises given
46
thereby.

...
The affairs of said corporation shall be managed by a board of trustees,
the number of which shall be regulated by by-law, but in no case shall
the number be less than four, nor more than sixteen. Three-fourths of
said trustees shall be elected by the members of the corporation, from
their own number. The other one-fourth of such trustees shall be
appointed from resident free-holders, by the board of aldermen of the
city where such corporation is situated, upon the nomination of the
47
mayor.

45.
46.
47.

1885 Mich. Pub. Acts 3, §§ 3-4, 15-16.
Articles of Incorporation of the Detroit Museum of Art (1885).
Id.
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The DMA purchased a plot of land at 704 E. Jefferson Avenue, and
built an art museum in the Richardsonian style, which opened to the public
on September 1, 1888. The founding collection of the DMA consisted of
more than 70 works of art donated by Scripps.
Initially, the DMA was privately funded. 48 In 1893, the City of
Detroit began providing funds from its contingent account to the DMA, in
exchange for the museum not charging an admission fee. In 1899, the
Michigan Legislature amended the charter of the City of Detroit,
empowering the Detroit Common Council to appropriate up to $20,000 per
year for the DMA, and the Common Council exercised that power. 49 In
1903, the Michigan Legislature again amended the charter of the City of
Detroit, empowering the Common Council to issue bonds to finance the
construction of a new building for the DMA. 50 In 1904, the Common
Council authorized a $50,000 bond issue to help finance the construction of
a new building for the DMA, which was approved by the Board of
Estimates, and sustained by the Wayne County Circuit Court. 51 The DMA
used the money to build a lecture hall and classrooms.
In November 1914, the DMA considered embarking on a significant
construction project, but was concerned that it might not be eligible to
receive public funding. On November 27, 1914, the DMA Board of
Directors decided to determine whether the DMA was legally eligible to
receive public funding. In 1915, the Board of Directors asked the
Controller of the City of Detroit to withhold funds payable to the DMA,
and filed an action to compel payment. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of
Michigan held that the act authorizing the Common Council to issue bonds
to finance the construction of a building for the DMA violated the
Michigan Constitution, which provided that “The credit of the state shall
not be granted to, nor in aid of any person, association or corporation,
public or private.” 52

48. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, DETROIT MUSEUM OF ART REPORT FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR JULY 1ST, 1917 TO JUNE 30, 1918 (1918).
49. Loc. Acts 1899, No. 429.
50. Loc. Acts 1903, No. 489, § 66 (“The common council shall also have power to
appropriate from time to time such sums as is necessary for the purpose of erecting an
additional building or buildings for the Detroit Museum of Art, which sums shall be paid
from the general fund. The common council shall also have power, with the approval of the
board of estimates, for the purpose of erecting such additional building or buildings for said
museum of art to borrow upon the best terms it can make and for such time as it shall deem
expedient, such sums of money as it shall deem necessary, not exceeding the sum of fifty
thousand dollars, and shall have authority to issue bonds pledging the faith and credit of said
city for the payment of the principal and interest of said bonds, which bonds shall be
denominated ‘Detroit Museum of Art Bonds,’ of the city of Detroit and shall bear interest
not exceeding four per cent. per annum.”).
51. See Detroit Museum of Art v. Engel, 153 N.W. 700, 701 (Mich. 1915).
52. MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 12.
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In 1916, the City devised a method of providing public funds to the
DMA that did not violate the constitutional prohibition on direct
appropriations. The City of Detroit Recreation Commission hired the
DMA to operate the museum without charging admission, in exchange for
$40,000 per year. 53 However, the DMA soon found itself in financial
distress. On January 11, 1918, the DMA resolved to close its art school for
lack of funds. 54
B. The Creation of the Detroit Institute of Art
On June 25, 1918, the City of Detroit created an Arts Commission,
consisting of four members, which was empowered to, inter alia, “build,
operate and maintain suitable buildings to be used for the exhibition of
paintings and works of art and auditorium purposes, to be known as the
Detroit Institute of Arts, and to which, under proper rules and regulations,
the public may have access free of charge”; “acquire, collect, own and
exhibit, in the name of the city, works of art, books, and other objects such
as are usually incorporated in Museums of Art”; “with the approval of the
common council, in the name of the city, take and hold, by purchase, gift,
devise, bequest or otherwise, such real and personal property as may be
proper for carrying out the intents and purposes for which it is established”;
and “with the approval of the council, sell and convey or lease any of the
buildings or land under its control, whenever required by the interests of
the city.” 55
In January 1919, the City appointed the initial members of the Arts
Commission. 56 On January 27, 1919, the Arts Commission submitted its
first proposed budget to the Detroit Common Council. 57 In March 1919,
the Common Council approved an initial appropriation of $85,000, and in
May 1919, it approved a final appropriation of $79,000, with $20,000
earmarked for the purchase of artwork. 58 The Arts Commission began to
consider purchasing artwork in April 1919, and made its first recorded
purchase on June 2, 1919, when it approved the purchase of two bronze
sculptures for $1,800. 59 Later that year, the Arts Commission also

53. ANNUAL REPORT, DMA BULLETIN, at 9 (1916); DMA Minutes, Apr. 29, 1916.
54. DMA Minutes, Jan. 11, 1918.
55. CITY CHARTER, title IV, ch. XIX, §§ 1, 7 (June 25, 1918).
56. REPORT OF THE ARTS COMM’N (1919); DIA BULLETIN, (Jan. 1920).
57. Minutes of the Arts Comm’n of the City of Detroit, Mich., Jan. 27, 1919.
58. Minutes of the Arts Comm’n of the City of Detroit, Mich., Mar. 3, 1919; Minutes
of the Arts Comm’n of the City of Detroit, Mich., May 12, 1919.
59. Minutes of the Arts Comm’n of the City of Detroit, Mich., Apr. 29, 1919
(considering the purchase of a rug collection); Minutes of the Arts Comm’n of the City of
Detroit, Mich., June 2, 1919.
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purchased six oil paintings, four etchings, three carved wood panels, and 44
textiles for the DIA collection. 60
On December 6, 1918, the members of the DMA authorized the
trustees to convey its property, including its building and art collection, to
the City. 61 And on February 18, 1919, the trustees authorized the President
and Treasurer “to execute and deliver to the City of Detroit a Deed of
Conveyance of said real estate, the deed to be in such form and with such
conditions as should to them appear sufficient to insure the use of said
property for the purpose for which the Detroit Museum of Art was
incorporated, or for some purpose kindred to such purpose.” 62
The President and Treasurer prepared a draft deed “which contained a
provision for the reversion of the title to the Detroit Museum of Art upon
the happening of either of the following conditions: (a) If the city should at
any time use or permit the use of said premises, or any part thereof, for any
other purpose than the one contemplated by Charter 19, Title 4, (IV),
relating to an Arts Commission of the present charter of the City of Detroit;
(b) If the city should fail within a given number of years to erect and
complete on said premises a building costing a lot less than an agreed sum,
suitable for the housing and exhibition of art, or (c) If the city should at any
time fail to provide for and continue the proper care, maintenance and
exhibition of the art collection then or thereafter belonging to the City of
Detroit.” 63
The President and Treasurer presented the draft deed to a committee
of the Detroit Common Council, which was “of the opinion that no Deed
would be accepted except one without conditions.” 64
On June 28, 1918, the President of the DMA observed in his report to
the members that the City of Detroit had appropriated $40,000 for the
DMA for 1918, with the expectation that the DMA would convey its
building and artwork to the City. “Consistent with this financial
encouragement, the city in its new charter has provided for an arts
commission, contemplating that you will convey the property and trusts
you hold to the city, as the basis for the Detroit Institute of Arts, as the new
institution is to be named. At a date to be set for the early fall you will
probably be called together for the special purpose of acting upon the
question of conveyance to the city, at which time your trustees will make
such recommendations as may appear to them best.” 65

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

REPORT OF THE ARTS COMM’N (1919); DIA BULLETIN, (Jan. 1920).
DMA Minutes, Jan. 27, 1920.
Id.
Id.
Id.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (June 28, 1918); DETROIT MUSEUM OF ART, ANNUAL
REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1918.
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On April 15, 1919, the State of Michigan enacted Public Act 67,
which amended the 1885 Act to provide:
Any of the real estate of a corporation organized under this act may be
used for any purpose which the circuit court in chancery, of the county
in which said corporation is situated determines to be a purpose kindred
to that for which the corporation is organized.
Any corporation organized under this act situated in a city empowered
to maintain a public art institute like or similar to that described in this
act, may convey all or any of its property to said city upon such terms,
in such manner and at such time or times as may be agreed upon by its
trustees and the legislative body of said city; and said property so
conveyed shall in the hands of said city be faithfully used for the
purposes for which such corporation was organized: Provided, however,
That any real estate so conveyed may be used for a kindred purpose as
provided in section nineteen of this act. Said trustees are hereby
empowered, in the event of their conveying to the city all of the
property of said corporation, to wind up its affairs by taking appropriate
66
proceedings in the circuit court in chancery, above mentioned.

On June 27, 1919, the President of the DMA informed the members of
developments in the plan to transfer the DMA’s building and collection to
the City of Detroit, noting that the City had rejected the DMA’s proposed
conditions on the transfer:
Beginning with the first of July, the Arts Commission of the City of
Detroit takes in charge the city funds for the carrying out of its purposes
and the building we now occupy has been placed in the hands of the
Arts Commission by the city for its uses. Carrying out your intention,
as expressed at our last meeting called for the purpose, steps have been
taken looking to the conveyance of our property and collections to the
City of Detroit with due regard for the trust we hold and of the
obligations attached thereto. The state legislature has amended the act
under which we incorporated which will become part of the law within
the next 60 days, under which it becomes proper for us to much such
conveyance to the municipality. Under such conveyance the property
can only be used for such purposes as we have received it or for some
kindred purpose so indicated by the Circuit Court. Final action on this
matter cannot be taken at this meeting, but inasmuch as we shall be
without funds for maintenance otherwise, your President suggests that if
it appears to you to be in order, that a resolution be passed indicating
the intention to make conveyance when the law permits and in the
meantime to ask the Arts Commission to accept the responsibility of the
operation and maintenance of the museum for us at the expense of the
city. In considering the all-important move of conveyance to the city,

66.

1919 Mich. Pub. Acts 67, §§ 19-20 (1919).
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permit me to mention at this time that during the past year your officers
have given particular attention to the value that might be set upon our
collections, real estate and other property, with the result that we
believe that the collections may be conservatively valued at a million
dollars and the new museum site on Woodward Avenue at over one
million dollars. Our invested endowments amount to $20,000. Cash on
hand available for purchases is $9,460.95. You have authorized your
Board of Trustees to act upon this matter in accordance with their
judgment, but opportunity for discussion will be given at this meeting.
It was expected to make conveyance of the real estate at once as the
required change in the law covered only the transfer of our collections.
It was thought reasonable and in conformity with our obligation to ask
the city to accept a deed to the real estate with a clause therein
providing that the property should revert to this corporation if the city
did not with a reasonable number of years erect thereon a suitable
Museum building and properly maintain the collections later to be
conveyed to it. This received the concurrence of Mr. Wm. C. Weber, in
whose name some of our property stands. The form of deed was
presented for consideration by the city council but the council expressed
a unanimous opinion that it would be inexpedient to accept such a
transfer with any reversionary clause or any other definitely expressed
obligation. If you should convey the real estate and the collections to
the city in conformity with the amended legislation it should be noted
that the property can be used only for such purposes as this permits, and
further the conveyance would be made to the Arts Commission, who
would hold the property in behalf of the city for its uses in accord with
the provision of the city charter and the immediate intention of the city
is definitely expressed in the appropriation for the ensuing year of
$79,000.00 to cover maintenance and upkeep of the Detroit Institute of
Arts, purchases for art collections and the sum of $3,000.00 to assist in
the development of plans for a new museum building, which may
67
clearly be taken as an earnest of intention.

The members of the DMA adopted a resolution authorizing the
trustees “to execute and deliver a Deed of the real and personal property of
the Association,” without conditions. 68 On June 30, 1919, the DMA
informed the City that it could no longer operate the museum, and offered
to transfer its collection to the City. 69 On July 1, 1919, the City accepted
the collection and assumed the maintenance and operation costs of the
museum pending formal conveyance. 70
67. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (June 27, 1919); DETROIT MUSEUM
REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1919, at 11-12.
68. DMA Minutes, Jan. 27, 1920.
69. See Letter from DMA to Arts Comm’n, June 30, 1919.
70. See Letter from Arts Comm’n to DMA, July 1, 1919.
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On September 12, 1919, the trustees authorized the President and
Treasurer to make the conveyance to the City. 71 And in November 1919,
the President and Treasurer “executed and delivered a Warranty Deed of
the real estate and a Bill of Sale of the collection of Art, both running to the
city of Detroit.” 72 They delivered the deed and bill of sale to the Arts
Commission, which presented them to the Common Council for approval.
The Common Council accepted both and approved them by resolution over
the Mayor’s veto. 73 On December 16, 1919, the Common Council
authorized the Controller to pay $35,863.22 for the DMA’s property. 74
And on December 29, the transaction was completed. 75
In 1920, the officers of the DMA made the following observation:
You will recall that Act #67 of the Public Acts of the State of Michigan,
approved April 15, 1919, under which authority was granted for the
conveyance by Art Associations to the municipality of their property,
contained a provision that the property so conveyed should in the hands
of the city be faithfully used for the purpose for which the particular
corporation was organized. In the Deed to the City of Detroit it was
expressly recited that the conveyance was executed and delivered under
and in pursuance of said act. This fact, together with the fact that the
Deed was delivered to the Arts Commission, seemed to us sufficiently
to give assurance that the property cannot be used excepting for the
same purposes as were provided for in the incorporation of the Detroit
Museum of Art, or some kindred purpose, as provided in the Act of the
76
Legislature referred to.

Notably, the DMA did not dissolve, but rather adopted the following
resolution:
WHEREAS all of the property and collections of the Detroit Museum
of Art, with the exceptions of its invested trust funds, have been
conveyed and transferred to the City of Detroit to be administered by
the newly created Arts Commission of the City of Detroit, and
WHEREAS it is believed that the following enumerated objects can be
obtained by the continuance of present corporation, i.e.
a - To promote public interest in and appreciation of art in Detroit
b - To co-operate in every way with the Detroit Institute of Arts, and to
augment its collections from membership funds and contributions

71. DMA Minutes, Jan. 27, 1920.
72. Id.
73. DMA Minutes, Jan. 27, 1920 (It is unclear why the Mayor vetoed the decision of
the Common Council).
74. REPORT OF CONTROLLER (Dec. 16, 1919).
75. Arts Comm’n Minutes, Dec. 29, 1919.
76. DMA Minutes, Jan. 27, 1920.
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c - To administer the funds and endowments now in the hands of the
corporation and to encourage and receive in trust and to administer
future gifts and legacies
Now, therefore be it
RESOLVED, that this corporation with its membership and funds be
continued and also be it
RESOLVED, that a committee of two be appointed by the President
(himself acting as ex-officio member) for recommending of such
changes and revisions as will best carry out the intentions herewith
77
expressed.

On February 20, 1920, the DMA informed its members that the
corporation would continue to exist under a new name, the “Detroit
Museum of Arts Founders’ Society.” 78 The purpose of the Founders’
Society was to assist the DIA “in every way,” and to use its endowment
fund and other contributions in order to add to the DIA’s collection. 79
In January 1920, the Arts Commission requested an additional
appropriation of funds from the City to purchase artwork, on the ground
that it was a capital investment, not an expense.
Because of their precious quality, art objects of suitable character for a
public collection require a large capital outlay. This appropriation,
however, is not an expense. The accessions purchased with it are a
continuing asset which constantly fulfills a sphere of usefulness in the
lives of the people, and at the same time these objects increase in
80
intrinsic worth each year.

The City agreed and provided an additional appropriation of $50,000,
which the Arts Commission used to purchase 27 paintings, 15 sculptures,
50 etchings, 15 woodcuts, and 36 other works. 81 Throughout the 1920s, the
Arts Commission added many works to the DIA collection, including
purchases, gifts, and bequests. The City also began construction of a new
DIA building on Woodward Avenue. And, in 1927, the DIA moved from
its original building on Jefferson Avenue to its current home on Woodward
Avenue.
In the 1930s, the Common Council reduced the Arts Commission’s
appropriation, forcing it to lay off the DIA’s curatorial staff and consider
closing the DIA. 82 However, the Mayor vetoed the Common Council’s

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

DMA Minutes, Jan. 27, 1920.
DMA Minutes, Feb. 20, 1920.
1920 DMA REPORT.
REPORT OF THE ARTS COMM’N, 1919; DIA Bulletin, Jan., 1920.
REPORT OF THE ARTS COMM’N (1920).
Letter from the Arts Comm’n to the Common Council, Jan. 1, 1932.
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action and increased the Arts Commission’s appropriation, enabling it to
keep the DIA open. 83
On January 29, 1962, the Detroit Museum of Arts Founders’ Society
changed its name to “Founders Society Detroit Institute of Arts.” 84 In
1962, the trustees of the DIA hired a new director, Willis Woods, who
secured public and private funding to expand the building. In 1966, the
DIA opened its South Wing, and in 1971, it opened its North Wing.
Woods also expanded the DIA’s collection, primarily through large
bequests. City funding for the DIA also increased between 1964 and 1974,
from $630,000 to $2,240,000.
However, in 1974, the City drastically reduced the DIA’s
appropriation, cutting $786,000 to $1,792,000. The DIA Director chose to
terminate the museum guards, forcing the DIA to temporarily close to the
public. 85 While the DIA attempted to pursue state funding, city funding
continued to decrease. In 1976, the City decreased the DIA appropriation
from $1,792,000 to $47,000. Luckily, state funding offset the decrease in
City funding, and the DIA’s budget remained stable. In 1977, the DIA’s
budget increased to $1,800,000, in addition to a $1,000,000 art acquisition
budget.
On September 30, 1992, the Founders Society Detroit Institute of Arts
changed its name to “The Detroit Institute of Arts Founders Society.” 86
And on October 11, 2000, it changed its name to “The Detroit Institute of
Arts.” 87
In the 1990s and 2000s state appropriations for the DIA gradually
began to decrease. And in 2010, the State reduced its DIA appropriation to
a token $20,000. In response to this financial crisis, the DIA laid off 20%
of its employees, and began a lobbying campaign to secure a tax millage to
fund the DIA. On August 7, 2010, Oakland County, Macomb County, and
Wayne County voted to approve the tax millage, which provides about $23
million in annual funding for the DIA, in exchange for the DIA providing
free admission to the residents of those counties.
IV. THE BANKRUPTCY COURT’S OPINIONS
On November 7, 2014, the bankruptcy court issued an oral opinion
confirming the City of Detroit’s plan of adjustment, and approving the
settlements incorporated into that plan of adjustment, including the DIA

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Arts Comm’n Public Statement, 1932.
See Certificate of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation, filed Jan. 29, 1962.
Arts Comm’n Minutes, Jun. 6, 1975.
Certificate of Assumed Name, filed Sept. 30, 1992.
Certificate of Amendment to the Articles of Incorporation, Oct. 11, 2000.
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settlement. 88 And on December 31, 2014, the bankruptcy court issued a
written opinion expanding on its written opinion. 89
A. The Bankruptcy Court’s Oral Opinion
On November 7, 2014, the bankruptcy court issued an oral opinion
confirming the City of Detroit’s plan of adjustment, and approving the
settlements incorporated into that plan of adjustment, concluding that they
were “reasonable, fair and equitable.” 90 Specifically, the bankruptcy court
found that the DIA settlement was both fair and in the best interest of the
creditors.
1. Fairness to the Creditors
In its oral opinion, the bankruptcy court concluded that the DIA
settlement was fair to the creditors because the City held the DIA art
subject to both a trust and specific transfer restrictions that prohibited its
sale. The court also observed that litigation would be lengthy and costly,
and that any attempt to sell the DIA might result in a cancellation of the
millage taxes that provided the majority of the DIA budget:
Addressing the fairness of the settlement, the Court will first examine
the relative strengths of the parties’ positions. Both the Michigan
Attorney General and the DIA itself take the position that the DIA art is
subject to a trust that prohibits the City from selling it to pay debts and
places it beyond the creditors’ reach. The DIA also asserts that the
donors of many of the pieces of art had imposed specific transfer
restrictions on them.
The evidence supports these assertions. The Court was especially
impressed with the testimony of Ms. Erickson on these points, and with
the historical documentary evidence that the DIA cited in its brief and
that was admitted in evidence.
The evidence further establishes that nationally accepted standards for
museums prohibit the de-acquisition of art to pay debt. The creditors
also admitted, perhaps grudgingly, that no creditor had ever considered
the value of the art as a possible source of repayment when it decided to
lend money to the City or to acquire City debt.
On the other hand, the creditors did submit substantial evidence and
legal grounds supporting the contrary view that the City can legally sell
or monetize the DIA art.

88. Oral Opinion on the Record, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (No.
13-53846).
89. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
90. Oral Opinion on the Record, In re City of Detroit (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014) (No.
13-53846).

FRYE.FORMATTED

Fall 2016]

11/22/2016 8:09 PM

Art & the “Public Trust” in Municipal Bankruptcy

651

On balance, the Court concludes that in any potential litigation
concerning the City’s right to sell the DIA art, or concerning the
creditors’ right to access the art to satisfy its claims, the position of the
Attorney General and the DIA almost certainly would prevail.
However, evidence also established that any such result in litigation
might well have taken years to achieve and would have been costly to
pursue. It also would have been difficult for the City to endure the
delay and expense while at the same time attempting to revitalize itself.
The DIA and the attorney general state with credibility that they would
vigorously contest any attempt to sell any art. Credible evidence also
establishes that an attempt by the City to sell its art might result in a
cancellation of the county millage taxes that support the DIA’s
operations and constitute almost 70% of the DIA’s budget.
The Court concludes that the DIA settlement was a most reasonable and
favorable settlement for the City and its pension creditors. The Court
readily approves it. Accordingly, the Court approves all aspects of the
91
grand bargain.

Essentially, the bankruptcy court held that the DIA settlement was fair
because Detroit could not sell the DIA art, which it owned subject to an
unspecified “trust,” as well as gift restrictions specific to particular works
of art. The court also recognized that “nationally accepted standards for
museums prohibit the de-acquisition of art to pay debt,” but did not
explicitly rely on those rules in reaching its conclusion. And the court
noted that the creditors had not relied on the DIA as collateral. Finally the
court observed that litigating Detroit’s right to sell the DIA art would be
costly and potentially harmful to the DIA.
2. The Best Interests of the Creditors
The bankruptcy court also held that the DIA settlement was in the best
interests of the creditors, primarily because Detroit refused to sell the DIA
art:
Section 943(b)(7) requires that the plan be in the best interests of
creditors. The cases generally hold that in chapter 9, this means that the
creditors will receive all that they can reasonably expect under the
circumstances. The only legal alternative to plan confirmation is
dismissal, because no other party can file a plan of adjustment and the
liquidation of a municipality’s assets is not permitted in chapter 9.
Accordingly, the Court will also consider whether the plan is a better
alternative for creditors than dismissal.

91.

Id. at 12-13.
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Under the plain language of section 943(b)(7), the issue is the best
interests of creditors as a whole, not any particular creditor or class of
creditors.
The Court finds that the plan is in the best interests of creditors.
Some creditors have argued that the City could pay more to creditors by
raising taxes and by monetizing assets, specifically the art at the DIA.
No provision of law allows the creditors to access the DIA art to satisfy
their claims, whether in bankruptcy or outside of bankruptcy. The
market value of the art, therefore, is irrelevant in this case. A judgment
creditor’s sole remedy is a court-ordered property tax assessment
process under Michigan’s Revised Judicature Act. Michigan law
prohibits execution on municipal property.
Some creditors argue that the best interest test in chapter 9 requires this
Court’s full consideration of all of the City’s assets, including the art,
even if the assets would not be accessible to unsecured creditors outside
of bankruptcy.
The Court also rejects the argument. The legal limitations on the
collection of judgments that apply outside of bankruptcy also constrain
the best interests of creditors test in bankruptcy. Neither the bankruptcy
code nor the case law suggests otherwise.
As noted, the City determined not to sell or monetize the DIA art in the
92
art market. Under section 904, that decision is off-limits to this Court.

Essentially, the court found that confirmation of the plan was in the
best interests of the creditors, because the only alternative was dismissal of
the plan, which would be worse for the creditors than confirmation. The
creditors asked the court to refuse to confirm the plan unless Detroit agreed
to sell some or all of the DIA art. The court effectively responded that
Detroit had refused to sell any of the DIA art, that the court could not force
Detroit to sell the DIA art, and that the DIA art was therefore not available
to the creditors as a remedy for their claims. In other words, the court
found that the DIA settlement was in the best interests of the creditors
because it was the best deal they could get.
But the court also observed that the continued existence of the DIA
was important to the future and economic recovery of Detroit:
However, even if the law did give the Court some authority here, the
Court would not have interfered with the City’s decision. The City
made the only appropriate decision. Maintaining the art at the DIA is
critical to the feasibility of the City’s plan of adjustment and to the
City’s future. The Court toured parts of the DIA and saw the art there,
as well as how its many visitors were experiencing the art. It also

92.

Id. at 22-23
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accepts the testimony of Ms. Erickson on the priceless value that the
DIA and the art creates for the City, the region and the state.
The evidence unequivocally establishes that the DIA stands at the center
of the City as an invaluable beacon of culture, education for both
children and adults, personal journey, creative outlet, family experience,
worldwide visitor attraction, civic pride and energy, neighborhood and
community cohesion, regional cooperation, social service, and
economic development. Every great City in the world actively pursues
these values. They are the values that Detroit must pursue to uplift,
inspire and enrich its residents and its visitors. They are also the values
that Detroit must pursue to compete in the national and global economy
to attract new residents, visitors and businesses. To sell the DIA art
would only deepen Detroit’s fiscal, economic and social problems. To
sell the DIA art would be to forfeit Detroit’s future. The City made the
right decision.
The City also rejected the concept of using the art as a collateral for a
loan to pay creditors, for two reasons. First, that proposal would just
substitute debt for debt and would not help the City. Second, if the City
defaulted, it might lose the art. The City made the right decision here
too.
Beyond that, the record reflects that the City has made reasonable
efforts to monetize other assets, including the Detroit Windsor Tunnel,
certain real estate properties, certain parking properties, the Joe Louis
arena property and certain other property that it no longer needs. It also
entered into the Great Lakes Water Authority memorandum of
understanding with Wayne, Oakland and Macomb Counties, which
benefits all creditors. The Court finds that the City has made reasonable
efforts to monetize its assets to satisfy the best interests of creditors test.
The evidence also establishes that raising taxes is not a viable option for
the City. In the eligibility opinion, the Court found that the City cannot
legally increase its tax rates. Mayor Duggan testified that the likelihood
of the people of Detroit or the state legislature voting to raise taxes is
remote.
Further, a property tax increase would produce very little additional
revenue. The Mayor testified that taxes in Detroit are among the
highest relative to surrounding communities and the city services are
comparatively low. Kevyn Orr credibly testified that the City is at tax
saturation and raising taxes would likely add to the population decline.
The evidence also establishes that the plan is a better, indeed much
better, alternative for creditors than dismissal. Significant City
obligations would become immediately due. As mentioned earlier, in
that scenario, the creditors’ only remedy is the property tax assessment
remedy under the Revised Judicature Act. It is easy to foresee that a
great number of creditors would race for that relief and the result would
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be chaos and an administrative nightmare for all involved. The City’s
reinvestment and revitalization initiatives would stall. The pension
UAAL and OPEB claims in the billions of dollars would go unresolved.
There is no more money available for creditors in the City’s already
tight budget projections. The Court’s feasibility expert so testified, as
the Court will review here shortly. Every dollar is accounted for in
providing necessary services, in implementing the City’s necessary
RRIs, and in repaying plan obligations. All of those cash uses are
essential to the City’s future.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the plan will provide creditors all that
they can reasonably expect under the circumstances and that it is in their
93
best interests.

In other words, the court recognized that the purpose of municipal
bankruptcy is not liquidation but reorganization. Municipal bankruptcy is
intended to enable a distressed municipal debtor to discharge its debts and
resume operations, while providing a reasonable and fairly distributed
recovery to its creditors. As a consequence, municipal bankruptcy does not
require a city to liquidate municipal assets that are necessary to the future
viability of the municipality, and the court took an expansive view of such
assets to include the DIA.
B. The Bankruptcy Court’s Written Opinion
On December 31, 2014, the bankruptcy court issued a written opinion
confirming the City of Detroit’s plan of adjustment. 94 In its written
opinion, the court affirmed its holding that the DIA settlement was fair and
in the best interests of the creditors. The written opinion also expanded on
the oral opinion, primarily by providing additional reasoning.
1. Fairness to the Creditors
In its written opinion, the bankruptcy court reiterated and expanded
upon its holding that the DIA settlement was fair because Detroit could not
and should not sell the DIA art. The court recognized the Michigan
Attorney General’s and the DIA corporation’s claims that “all of the art at
the DIA is held in charitable trust for the benefit of the people of the State
and so it cannot be sold to pay the City’s debts.” 95 The court also
recognized the DIA corporation’s claim that “the donors of many of the
pieces of art imposed specific transfer restrictions on them.” 96 The court
recognized that “the Attorney General, the DIA itself and even many of its
individual donors would vigorously challenge any attempt by the City to
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 23-25.
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
Id. at 177.
Id.
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sell any of the art.” 97 And the court observed that “[a]ny sale could result
in the cancellation of the tri-county millage taxes that support almost 70%
of the DIA’s operating budget.” 98
The court found that the DIA “presented credible historical
documentary evidence in support of its position that the City holds the art
in trust.” 99 The court identified three bases for the DIA’s argument that
Detroit held the DIA art in trust.
First, the court observed that “Public Act 67 of 1919, which provided
for the transfer of the DIA real property and its art from the Detroit
Museum of Art (the predecessor to the DIA) to the City, required that the
‘property so conveyed shall in the hands of said city be faithfully used for
the purposes for which the [Detroit Museum of Art] was organized.’” 100
And the court recognized that the trustees of the DMA “believed the
restrictions in PA 67 of 1919 ‘give assurance that the property cannot be
used excepting for the same purposes as were provided for in the
incorporation of the Detroit Museum of Art.’” 101
Second, the court observed that the May 15, 1984 Operating
Agreement between Detroit and the Founders Society “state that the City
‘has maintained and operated the DIA for over 60 years for the benefit of
the citizens of the City and the State of Michigan’” and that “the City
would use state-allocated funds solely for the DIA, which was consistent
with ‘the goal of continuing to benefit the citizens of the City and the State
by preserving for their enjoyment the treasures of the DIA[.]’” 102
Third, the court observed that “the DIA’s current Collection
Management Policy states that ‘the [DIA] must be ever aware of its role as
trustee of the collection for the benefit of the public’” and that “the façade
of the DIA itself, built by the City in 1927, states that it is ‘Dedicated by
the People of Detroit to the Knowledge and Enjoyment of Art.’” 103
The court concluded that these historical facts provided “strong
evidence that the DIA was founded for the benefit of the residents of the
City and the State, that the City believed that this was the case when the
City received title to the art in 1919, and that the City has treated the DIA
as a public trust for over one hundred years.” 104
The court also observed that “nationally accepted standards for
museums prohibit the de-acquisition of art to pay debt.” 105 Specifically, the
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id.
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 177.
Id.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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court recognized that the standards of the Association of Art Museum
Directors (the “AAMD”) only permit museums to sell works of art in order
to purchase new works of art, and prohibit museums from selling works of
art for any other purpose, including to pay operating expenses, which
would include city debt. As a consequence, the court recognized that “if
the City sold any of its art to pay its debts, the national and international art
community would refuse to do business with the DIA.” 106
Finally, the court observed that selling some or all of the DIA art
could “flood the art market” and lower prices. “Consequently, there is no
guaranty that the City would achieve the high returns that many creditors
asserted.” 107
The court acknowledged that “the creditors did submit substantial
evidence and legal grounds to support the contrary view that the City can
legally sell or monetize the DIA art.” 108 Specifically, the court observed
that “the current DIA Operating Agreement states that ‘[t]he City shall
retain title to and ownership of the (a) City art collection and (b) the DIA
properties.’” 109
But the court concluded that “in any potential litigation concerning the
City’s right to sell the DIA art, or concerning the creditors’ right to access
the art to satisfy their claims, the position of the Attorney General and the
DIA would almost certainly prevail.” 110 Notably, the court did not explain
why it reached that conclusion. But it also observed that “any such
litigation would take years to conclude and would be costly to pursue” and
that “[i]t . . . would be difficult for the City to endure that delay and
expense while at the same time attempting to revitalize itself.” 111
2. The Best Interests of the Creditors
The court also concluded that the DIA settlement was in the best
interests of the creditors under Section 943(b)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act,
because it provided “‘a better alternative for creditors than what they
already have.’” 112 The court observed that under Chapter 9, the only
options are confirmation or dismissal of the municipality’s plan of
adjustment, so the question is “whether the available state law remedies
could result in a greater recovery for the City’s creditors than confirmation
of the plan.” 113 The court concluded that they could not, and “that losing

106. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 178.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (emphasis omitted).
110. Id. at 179.
111. Id.
112. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 213 (quoting In re Pierce Cty. Hous. Auth., 414
B.R. 702, 718 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009)).
113. Id.
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the benefits of the plan will actually impair creditors’ recoveries under
these state law remedies.” 114
Specifically, the court held that the DIA settlement was in the best
interests of the creditors because “no provision of law allows the creditors
to access City assets, most importantly including the DIA art, to satisfy
their claims. The market value of the City’s assets, including its art is,
therefore, irrelevant in this case.” 115 Certain creditors argued that the court
should consider the market value of Detroit’s assets in determining whether
the plan was in the best interests of the creditors. But the court disagreed,
concluding that “[t]he legal limitations on the collection of judgments that
apply outside of bankruptcy also constrain the best interests of creditors test
in bankruptcy.” 116 As the court explained, “the City determined not to sell
or monetize the DIA art in the art market. Under § 904, that decision is
off-limits to the Court.” 117
The court further observed that even if Detroit could sell the DIA art,
it should not do so.
However, even if the law did give the Court some authority here, the
Court would not have interfered with the City’s decision. The City
made the only appropriate decision. Maintaining the art at the DIA is
critical to the feasibility of the City’s plan and to the City’s future. . . .
To sell the DIA art would only deepen Detroit’s fiscal, economic and
social problems. To sell the DIA art would be to forfeit Detroit’s
118
future. The City made the right decision.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the DIA settlement and the plan
of adjustment as a whole were in the best interests of the creditors because
they provided the creditors with as much as they could reasonably expect to
receive. “The Court finds that the City has made reasonable efforts to
monetize its assets to satisfy the best interests of creditors test.” 119
V. ANALYSIS OF THE BANKRUPTCY COURT’S OPINIONS
The bankruptcy court’s oral and written opinions with respect to the
DIA settlement were broadly similar. In both, the bankruptcy court found
that the DIA settlement was fair to the creditors because Detroit could not
sell the DIA art, and found that the DIA settlement was in the best interests
of the creditors because Detroit would not and should not sell the DIA art.
The primary difference between the two is that the written opinion
elaborated on the court’s reasons for concluding that Detroit could not sell

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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Id. at 218.
Id.
Id.
In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 218.
Id. at 219.
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the DIA art, and that Detroit’s unwillingness to sell the DIA art was both
dispositive and correct.
However, the court’s conclusions as to why the DIA settlement was
both fair to the creditors and in the best interests of the creditors are
mutually contradictory. If Detroit could not sell the DIA art, its refusal to
sell the DIA art was irrelevant to the best interests of the creditors. So why
did the court rely on Detroit’s refusal to sell the DIA art to conclude that
the DIA settlement was in the best interests of the creditors?
The inescapable answer is that the court’s stated conclusion that
Detroit could not sell the DIA art was incorrect, and the court surely knew
that it was incorrect. Detroit owned the DIA art outright, not subject to the
“public trust” or a charitable trust, and few if any of the works of art in the
DIA collection were affected by private gift restrictions. Moreover, not
only could Detroit sell the DIA art, it did in fact sell the DIA art. The DIA
settlement itself specifically provided that Detroit would sell the DIA art to
the DIA corporation, in exchange for contributions of $816 million over
twenty years from the DIA corporation and other charitable foundations
and the State of Michigan.
However, the court’s conclusion that the DIA settlement was fair to
the creditors was still correct, even though Detroit could sell the DIA art,
because the court could not force the City to sell the DIA art, and the
creditors were not entitled to collect on the DIA art. Accordingly, the DIA
settlement was fair, not only because the plan of adjustment fairly
distributed Detroit’s available assets among its different classes of
creditors, but also because the DIA settlement actually resulted in Detroit
selling the DIA art and distributing the assets generated by the sale to the
creditors. While Detroit was not obligated to sell the DIA art, it chose to
do so anyway, resulting in a plan of confirmation that was arguably more
generous to the creditors than they were entitled. As a consequence, the
DIA settlement was clearly in the best interests of the creditors, as it
increased the amount of their recovery. Moreover, the DIA settlement was
instrumental in convincing Detroit’s pensioners, its most politically potent
and vulnerable class of creditors, to consent to the final plan of adjustment.
A. Fairness to the Creditors
In both its oral opinion and its written opinion, the bankruptcy court
concluded that the DIA settlement was fair to the creditors because the City
could not sell the DIA art. While the court did not specify why it
concluded that the City could not sell the DIA art, it recognized three
possible reasons: 1) the City owned the DIA subject to the “public trust” or
a charitable trust; 2) professional rules governing museums prohibit them
from deaccessioning works in order to pay debt; and 3) the sale of the DIA
art would not generate as much revenue as projected. On examination,
none of these are convincing.
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1. The City Did Not Own the DIA Art Subject to the “Public Trust” or a
Charitable Trust
First, the bankruptcy court observed that the Michigan Attorney
General and the DIA argued that the City owned the DIA art subject to the
“public trust” or a charitable. The law supports neither of these claims.
The City did not and could not own the DIA subject to the “public trust”
because the “public trust” doctrine only applies to natural resources like
navigable waters and parks, and does not apply to chattel property like
works of art.
a. The “Public Trust” Doctrine
The “public trust” doctrine grew out of Roman and English law, both
of which provided that certain rights to use navigable waters were
irrevocably dedicated to the public, and could not be alienated by the
sovereign, with certain qualifications.120 United States law incorporated
the public trust doctrine, providing that the federal and state governments
held the navigable waters of the United States “in trusteeship” for the
public. 121 As Joseph Sax explained in his history of the “public trust”
doctrine, “American law courts held it ‘inconceivable’ that any person
should claim a private property interest in the navigable waters of the
United States.” 122
However, under United States law, the public trust doctrine does not
prohibit all conveyances of navigable waters, only those which are
inconsistent with the government’s obligation to exercise its police
powers. 123 Accordingly, under the “public trust” doctrine, a person can
claim a private property interest in a section of the shoreline, but cannot
claim a private property interest in the majority of the waterfront of the
City of Chicago. 124 The former may be consistent with the public interest,
but the latter cannot.
Eventually, United States courts arguably extended the public trust
doctrine to include certain lands dedicated to public use as parks, in a
limited fashion.125 While some scholars have argued that the public trust
doctrine should be interpreted expansively to include any property owned
by a public or charitable entity, it currently applies only to real property
dedicated to a public use. No state has applied the public trust doctrine to

120. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); see also Carol M. Rose,
Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOL. L.Q. 351 (1998).
121. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
122. Sax, supra note 121, at 484.
123. See Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
124. See id.
125. See Sax, supra note 121, at 556.
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chattel property, and more specifically, no state has applied the public trust
doctrine to works of art.
And quite rightly. The purpose of the public trust doctrine is to
protect the sovereign authority of government bodies by prohibiting them
from conveying private property rights that would prevent them from
exercising their sovereign authority. 126 The sale of chattel property does
not and cannot prevent a government body from exercising its sovereign
authority. While it is perfectly reasonable to argue that a government body
should not sell works of art, it is nonsensical to argue that selling works of
art would prevent a government body from exercising its sovereign
authority. In fact, the opposite could easily be the case. For example,
under the DIA settlement, Detroit sold the DIA art in order to enable itself
to exercise its sovereign authority and satisfy the legitimate demands of its
pensioners.
b. The DIA Art & the “Public Trust”
While the DIA corporation argued that the City owned the DIA art
subject to the “public trust,” its argument on that point was desultory at
best. The DIA correctly observed that the “public trust” doctrine provides
that “governmental entities have a duty to preserve and protect resources
held in trust for the public” and that Michigan recognizes the doctrine. 127
But it conceded that no Michigan court has ever found that the “public
trust” doctrine applies to “cultural property” like a museum collection, and
merely argued that the court should extend the doctrine and apply it to
museums. 128
The Michigan Attorney General also grudgingly conceded that the
“public trust” doctrine only applies to natural resources, and does not apply
to museum collections. “The term ‘public trust’ as used by museums and
their associations should not be equated with the ‘public trust doctrine’ that
Michigan and other courts have applied to navigable waterways.” 129
In sum, the claim that the City owned the DIA art subject to the
“public trust” was entirely unfounded and not taken seriously by the parties
or the court. Moreover, it makes no sense to apply the “public trust”
126. But see, e.g., Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The “Public Trust”, 18 U. PA. J. CON. L.
(forthcoming 2016) (arguing that the “public trust” doctrine should be construed in light of
the term “public Trust” in the No Religious Test clause of Art. VI of the Constitution, and
may prevent museums from selling art works under certain circumstances).
127. See Illinois Central R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452; see also Glass v. Goeckel, 703
N.W.2d 58, 65 (Mich. 2005).
128. Response of the Detroit Institute of Arts to Objections to the City’s Amended Plan
of Confirmation at 19, In re City of Detroit, Mich., 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
129. Conveyance or Transfer of DIA Collection, Mich. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 7272, at 10
n.8 (2013) (citing Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005); Netweg v. Wallace, 208
N.W. 51 (Mich. 1926); State v. Venice of America Land Co., 125 N.W. 770 (Mich. 1910)),
available at http://media.mlive.com/news/detroit_impact/other/AGO%207272.pdf.
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doctrine to chattel property like works of art. As Donn Zaretsky has
trenchantly observed, “it is not at all inconceivable that any person should
claim a private property in [works of art]. It is in fact quite conceivable:
most works of art are privately owned.” 130 Indeed, most art museums are
nonprofit corporations that privately own works of art which they may
freely sell. If anything, the DIA art was the exception to the rule, given
that it actually was owned by a public entity, the City of Detroit. But it was
owned by the City like any other chattel property, which the City could and
did freely sell.
c. The DIA Art & Charitable Trust Law
The Attorney General and the DIA also argued that Detroit could not
sell the DIA art because it owned the DIA art subject to a charitable trust.
And the bankruptcy court apparently agreed, finding that the DIA
“presented credible historical documentary evidence in support of its
position that the City holds the art in trust.” 131 But it was incorrect. The
evidence presented by the Attorney General and the DIA corporation did
not support a finding that Detroit owned the DIA art subject to a charitable
trust.
First, the Attorney General and the DIA claimed that the 1885 Articles
of Incorporation of the DMA established a charitable trust. 132 That is
plainly incorrect. The DMA was formed as a charitable corporation, not a
charitable trust. 133 Moreover, in 1885, Michigan law did not even
recognize charitable trusts. 134 So if the DMA had been formed as a
charitable trust, the trust would have been invalid. Notably, the bankruptcy
court simply ignored this argument.
Second, the Attorney General and the DIA claimed that Public Act 67
of 1919, which authorized the DMA to transfer its assets to a “city
empowered to maintain a public arts institute,” either perpetuated or
created a charitable trust obligating Detroit to “perpetuate and ‘maintain a
public art institute’ that would exhibit art to the general public, and to

130. DONN ZARETSKY, There’s No Such Thing as the Public Trust, and It’s a Good
Thing, Too, THE LEGAL GUIDE FOR MUSEUM PROFESSIONALS 151, 153 (Julia Courtney, ed.
2015).
131. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 177 (2014).
132. Conveyance or Transfer of DIA Collection, Mich. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 7272 at 18;
Response of the Detroit Institute of Arts to Objections to the City’s Amended Plan of
Confirmation, May 27, 2014, at 13.
133. See generally Articles of Incorporation of the Detroit Museum of Art (1885).
134. See, e.g., Chicago Bank of Commerce v. McPherson, 62 F.2d 393, 395 (6th Cir.
1932) (“For nearly a hundred years prior to 1907 charitable trusts were not recognized by
the laws of Michigan.”); see also Hopkins v. Crossley, 96 N.W. 499, 499–501 (Mich. 1903)
(invalidating a nonprofit corporation’s attempt to create a charitable trust).
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‘faithfully [ . . . ] use [. . .]’ the art conveyed for that purpose. 135 The
bankruptcy court apparently credited this claim, finding that Public Act 67
“required that the ‘property so conveyed shall in the hands of said city be
faithfully used for the purposes for which the [Detroit Museum of Art] was
organized,’” and that the trustees of the DMA “believed the restrictions in
PA 67 of 1919 ‘give assurance that the property cannot be used excepting
for the same purposes as were provided for in the incorporation of the
Detroit Museum of Art.’” 136
These arguments are also incorrect. The terms under which the DMA
transferred its assets to Detroit unequivocally show that no charitable trust
was created, and that Detroit expressly rejected the DMA’s efforts to create
a charitable trust. The City created the Arts Commission and established
the DIA before the DMA transferred its assets to the City. 137 The DMA
initially offered to sell its assets to the City subject to the condition that title
would revert to the DMA if, among other things, the City “did not suitably
provide for the care and maintenance of the collections of the Detroit
Museum of Art.” 138 The City rejected the DMA’s offer on the ground that
it would only accept an unconditional transfer. 139 And on December 29,
1919, the City purchased the DMA’s assets for $35,863.22, pursuant to a
bill of sale and two deeds that included no conditions.
In other words, not only did the bill of sale and deeds not explicitly
create a charitable trust, but also the City expressly refused to accept terms
that might have created a charitable trust. While the City may have had a
statutory obligation to use the assets transferred to it by the DMA for the
purpose of operating an art museum, it did not own those assets subject to a
charitable trust. And any wishful thinking to the contrary on the part of the
trustees of the DMA is simply irrelevant.
Third, the Attorney General and the DIA claimed that the City
recognized or created a charitable trust by representing that it held the DIA
art in charitable trust for the people of Michigan. 140 The bankruptcy court
also apparently credited this claim, observing that the May 15, 1984
Operating Agreement between the City and the Founders Society “states
that the City ‘has maintained and operated the DIA for over 60 years for
the benefit of the citizens of the City and the State of Michigan’” and that
135. Conveyance or Transfer of DIA Collection, Mich. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 7272, at 19;
See also Response of the Detroit Institute of Arts to Objections to the City’s Amended Plan
of Confirmation, May 27, 2014, at 14.
136. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 177.
137. See Detroit City Charter (1918), Tit. III, Ch. XIX.
138. See DMA Minutes, Feb. 18, 1919.
139. See Arts Comm’n Minutes, June 2, 1919.
140. State of Michigan, Mich. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 7272, at 20-21, available at
http://www.ag.state.mi.us/opinion/datafiles/2010s/op10351.htm; see also Response of the
Detroit Institute of Arts to Objections to the City’s Amended Plan of Confirmation, May 27,
2014, at 15-16.
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“the City would use state-allocated funds solely for the DIA, which was
consistent with ‘the goal of continuing to benefit the citizens of the City
and the State by preserving for their enjoyment the treasures of the
DIA.’” 141 Further, the court observed that “the DIA’s current Collection
Management Policy states that ‘the [DIA] must be ever aware of its role as
trustee of the collection for the benefit of the public’” and that “the façade
of the DIA itself, built by the City in 1927, states that it is ‘Dedicated by
the People of Detroit to the Knowledge and Enjoyment of Art.’” 142
These arguments are even more clearly incorrect. None of these
statements made by Detroit even colorably recognize or create a charitable
trust. They are mere hortatory language, reflecting the City’s commitment
to benefit the people of Detroit and the State of Michigan. Notably, with a
few rare exceptions, the City refused to accept donations to the DIA subject
to any conditions. Not only did the City not recognize or create any
charitable trusts, it affirmatively refused to accept donations that could be
construed as creating charitable trusts. In fact, many of the works in the
DIA collection were simply purchased by the City with City funds.
Notably, the bankruptcy court acknowledged that “the creditors did
submit substantial evidence and legal grounds to support the contrary view
that the City can legally sell or monetize the DIA art,” and observed that
“the current DIA Operating Agreement states that ‘[t]he City shall retain
title to and ownership of the (a) City art collection and (b) the DIA
properties.’” 143
In sum, the bankruptcy court’s suggestion that the City could not sell
the DIA art because it owned the DIA subject to a charitable trust is clearly
incorrect. The City owned the DIA art, and owned almost all of the DIA
art subject to no restrictions. Accordingly, it could have sold most of the
DIA art at its discretion.
Moreover, as a group of creditors observed, the DIA settlement itself
expressly provided for the sale of the DIA to the DIA corporation.
DIA Corp. and the Attorney General allege that the City is the trustee of
a charitable trust encompassing the DIA Collection, held for the
purposes set forth in the DMA’s 1885 Articles of Incorporation, namely
“the public exhibition of its collection of works of art.” By their logic,
if the DIA Collection is held in charitable trust for the benefit of the
people of the State of Michigan, and the terms of such trust provide that
artwork may only be sold or encumbered to buy additional pieces of
artwork, then the City has no right to monetize the artwork to satisfy its

141.
142.
143.

In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 178.
Id.
Id.
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general municipal obligations (such as the repayment of its debts). This
144
is precisely what the City is doing pursuant to the Grand Bargain.

Likewise, Professor David Skeel recognized that the DIA settlement
amounted to a sale of the DIA art to the private DIA corporation:
The deal calls for Detroit to “sell” its art to a newly created trust that is
required to keep the art in the city, using roughly $370 million raised
from the Ford, Kresge, Knight and other foundations, $350 million from
the state of Michigan (if the Republican legislature agrees) and the
institute’s own funds. Not only would the new entity keep the art in
Detroit but also the entire $816 million would be used to pay Detroit’s
pensioners. The art world and Detroit’s pensioners both win. It’s
145
almost like the deus ex machina solution to a Greek play.

If the City owned the DIA art subject to a charitable trust, then the
DIA settlement violated that charitable trust in precisely the same way that
the sale of the DIA art on the open market would have violated that
charitable trust. The bankruptcy court’s conclusion that the City could not
sell the DIA art because the City owned the DIA art subject to a charitable
trust is unconvincing not only because the bankruptcy court failed to
identify any plausible reason to believe that a charitable trust existed, but
also because the bankruptcy court approved the DIA settlement, under
which the City sold the DIA art to the DIA corporation. In other words,
while the bankruptcy court found that the City could not sell the DIA art,
by approving the DIA settlement, it actually held that the City could sell
the DIA art.
In a recent article largely tracking and elaborating on the arguments
made by the Michigan Attorney General and the DIA corporation, Steven
W. Golden argues that Detroit owned the DIA art subject to a charitable
trust and therefore could not sell the DIA art. 146 While Golden correctly
argues that Detroit could have owned the DIA art subject to a charitable
trust, and that Detroit could not sell the DIA art if it owned the DIA art
subject to a charitable trust, he fails to show that Detroit actually owned the
DIA art subject to a charitable trust. Indeed, he relies on precisely the same
unconvincing claims made by the Michigan Attorney General and the DIA
corporation. Not only did Detroit not expressly intend to create a charitable
trust, it expressly rejected the DMA’s efforts to create a charitable trust.

144. Joint Pretrial Brief in Support of Objection to the DIA Settlement, In re City of
Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Feb. 21, 2014).
145. David Skeel, Detroit’s clever and likely illegal art-for-pensions deal,
WASHINGTON POST, May 9, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/detroitsclever-and-likely-illegal-art-for-pensions-deal/2014/05/09/e3f93e84-cf1e-11e3-a6b145c4dffb85a6_story.html?utm_term=.ad19647722f0.
146. See generally, Steven W. Golden, In Art We Trust: The Intersection of Trust and
Bankruptcy Law in Detroit, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 313 (2016).
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Moreover, Golden fails to address the fact that the under the DIA
settlement, Detroit actually did sell the DIA art to the DIA corporation. Of
course, Detroit sold the DIA art to the DIA corporation on the
understanding that the DIA corporation would manage the DIA collection
subject to the relevant professional standards (i.e. that it would sell works
of art only in order to purchase works of art) and that the DIA corporation
would remain in Detroit. But the DIA settlement still amounted to the sale
of a public asset to a private entity, the DIA corporation.
2. Deaccessioning Standards Were Irrelevant and Indefensible
The bankruptcy court also observed that “nationally accepted
standards for museums prohibit the de-acquisition of art to pay debt,” and
that “if the City sold any of its art to pay its debts, the national and
international art community would refuse to do business with the DIA.” 147
And the bankruptcy court was correct, as far as it goes.
The most important professional associations governing art museums
are the American Alliance of Museums (“AAM”) and the Association of
Art Museum Directors (“AAMD”). Both the AAM and the AAMD have
adopted policies governing “deaccessioning” or the de-acquisition of
artworks. “Deaccessioning is defined as the process by which a work of art
or other object (collectively, a ‘work’), wholly or in part, is permanently
removed from a museum’s collection.” 148 The AAM and AAMD
deaccessioning policies both permit museums to sell artworks in their
collections only to purchase additional artworks, prohibit museums from
selling works of art in their collections for any other purpose, including to
pay operating expenses.
The AAM Code of Ethics for Museums explicitly provides that the
proceeds from deaccessioned works may only be used for acquisition or the
care of the collection:
The distinctive character of museum ethics derives from the ownership,
care and use of objects, specimens, and living collections representing
the world’s natural and cultural common wealth. This stewardship of
collections entails the highest public trust and carries with it the
presumption of rightful ownership, permanence, care, documentation,
accessibility and responsible disposal.
Thus, the museum ensures that:
...

147. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. at 178.
148. Association of Art Museum Directors Policy on Deaccessioning 2, June 9, 2010,
available
at
https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/AAMD%20Policy%20on%20Deaccessioning
%20website.pdf.

FRYE.FORMATTED

666

11/22/2016 8:09 PM

UNIVERSITY OF DETROIT MERCY LAW REVIEW
•

[Vol. 93:629

disposal of collections through sale, trade or research activities
is solely for the advancement of the museum’s mission.
Proceeds from the sale of nonliving collections are to be used
consistent with the established standards of the museum’s
discipline, but in no event shall they be used for anything other
149
than acquisition or direct care of collections.”

The AAMD Policy on Deaccessioning provides more specifically that
proceeds from the sale of a deaccessioned artwork may only be used for
acquisition, and explicitly provides that they may not be used for
operations or capital expenses:
I. Purpose of Deaccessioning and Disposal
A. Deaccessioning is a legitimate part of the formation and care of
collections and, if
practiced, should be done in order to refine and improve the quality and
appropriateness of the collections, the better to serve the museum’s
mission.
B. Funds received from the disposal of a deaccessioned work shall not
be used for
operations or capital expenses. Such funds, including any earnings and
appreciation thereon, may be used only for the acquisition of works in a
manner
consistent with the museum’s policy on the use of restricted acquisition
funds. In
order to account properly for their use, AAMD recommends that such
funds,
including any earnings and appreciation, be tracked separate from other
acquisition funds.

150

The AAMD Policy on Deaccessioning also provides for imposing
sanctions on member and nonmember museums that violate the policy:
VIII. Sanctions
In the event a member or museum violates one or more of the
provisions of this Policy, the member may be subject to censure,
suspension, and/or expulsion, and the museummay be subject to censure
and/or sanctions in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code
of Ethics of the AAMD, which have been amended consistent with the
following:

149. American Alliance of Museums, Code of Ethics for Museums (2000), available at
http://www.aam-us.org/resources/ethics-standards-and-best-practices/code-of-ethics.
150. Association of Art Museum Directors Policy on Deaccessioning, supra note 149,
at 4-5.
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A museum director shall only dispose of accessioned works of art in
accordance with the Professional Practices and the Task Force Report
adopted by the members on June 9, 2010, as the same may be
amended.
The Code of Ethics provides that AAMD members who violate the
Code may be subject to discipline by censure as determined by the
Board of Trustees of the AAMD and/or, suspension and/or expulsion
from the Association in accordance with the By-Laws of the AAMD.
Infractions by any art museum may expose that institution to censure
and/or sanctions, as determined by the Board of Trustees of the
AAMD, that may, in the case of sanctions, include, without
limitation, suspension of loans and shared exhibitions between the
sanctioned museum and museums of which AAMD members are
151
directors.

The AAM and AAMD claim that museums may not deaccession
works of art for any purpose other than the purchase of works of art
because they own their collections subject to the “public trust.” 152 For
example, the The AAM Code of Ethics for Museums repeatedly invokes
the “public trust”:
Thus, the museum ensures that:
•

collections in its custody support its mission and public trust
responsibilities
...

•

acquisition, disposal, and loan activities conform to its mission
and public trust responsibilities
...

•

collections-related activities promote the public good rather
153
than individual financial gain

Likewise, the AAMD Policy on Deaccessioning invokes the “interests
of the public”:
Deaccession decisions must be made with great thoughtfulness, care,
and prudence. Expressions of donor intent should always be respected
in deaccession decisions and the interests of the public, for whose
benefit collections are maintained, must always be foremost in making
154
deaccession decisions.

151.
152.
153.
154.
at 3.

Id. at 9-10.
ZARETSKY, supra note 131, at 151.
American Alliance of Museums Code of Ethics for Museums, supra note 150.
Association of Art Museum Directors Policy on Deaccessioning, supra note 149,
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And opponents of deaccessioning for any purpose other than
purchasing artwork have eagerly adopted this argument.155 For example,
the Michigan Attorney General and the DIA both argued, inter alia, that
the City could not sell the DIA art because it owned the DIA art subject to
the “public trust.” 156
However, the argument that art museums own the artworks in their
collections subject to the “public trust” is obviously false and borders on
ridiculous. As observed above, the “public trust” doctrine only applies to
natural resources like navigable waters and parks, not chattel property like
artworks. 157 But more damningly, if art museums owned works of art
subject to the “public trust” then they could not sell them for any purpose,
including the purchase of artwork. And that is simply not the case. In fact,
charitable art museums can legally sell works of art from their collection
for any purpose that is consistent with their charitable mission. 158 And
non-charitable art museums can legally sell works of art from their
collection for any reason or no reason, at their discretion.
Indeed, the AAM and AAMD positions on deaccessioning are simply
incoherent. If art museums own the artworks in their collections subject to
the “public trust,” then they cannot sell those works for any reason,
including the purchase of artworks. As Donn Zaretsky has repeatedly and
amusingly observed, either art museums own the artworks in their
collections subject to the “public trust,” or they do not. The AAM and
AAMD wish to have their cake and eat it too.
Of course, the AAM and AAMD, as well as other opponents of
deaccessioning artwork for any purpose other than purchasing artwork,
actually rely on “ethical” rather than legal arguments. In other words, while
art museums can legally sell artworks from their collections for any reason,
including operations and capital costs, they should not do so.
And yet, it is unclear why it is “ethical” to sell artworks in order to
buy artworks, but “unethical” to sell artworks for other purposes. For
example, under the AAM and AAMD guidelines, it is “unethical” for an art
museum to sell a work of art in order to avoid bankruptcy. As a
consequence, art museums facing financial crises have been forced to
close, when the sale of a single artwork could have covered their expenses.
Most recently, the Corcoran Museum of American Art found itself in
precisely this situation, and we lost an American institution. Would it
really have been “unethical” for the Corcoran to have sold an artwork in
order to maintain its existence? Would it really be “unethical” for a

155. ZARETSKY, supra note 131, at 151.
156. See supra notes 132-48 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
158. See generally Mark S. Gold, Monetizing the Collection: The Intersection of Law,
Ethics, and Trustee Prerogative, in THE LEGAL GUIDE FOR MUSEUM PROFESSIONALS 127
(Julia Courtney, ed. 2015).
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museum to sell an artwork from its collection in order to provide free
admission? Would it really be “unethical” for a university art museum to
sell an artwork in order to provide scholarships?
Indeed, a modicum of cynicism suggests an alternative reason that the
AAM and AAMD rules might prohibit museums from selling artworks
from their collections for any purpose other than purchasing artworks:
supply and demand. Artwork is an asset, and the people who own artworks
want to internalize the value of their assets. Art museums obtain artworks
primarily by way of donations, for which the donor is entitled to a tax
deduction based on the value of the work. And the value of artwork
depends primarily on scarcity. If museums sold artworks from their
collections for the purpose of raising cash, they would be competing with
their benefactors. The AAM and AAMD prohibitions on museums selling
artwork for any purpose other than purchasing artwork means that donating
an artwork to a museum effectively preserves scarcity. And museums
selling artwork in order to buy artwork is tolerated by donors because it is
effectively a wash. While it reduces scarcity of one artist’s work, it
increases scarcity of another.
Of course, this interpretation of the AAM and AAMD rules on
deaccessioning calls into question their foundation in “ethical” principles.
Not only do they impose restrictions that needlessly prevent museums from
selling artworks for socially beneficial purposes, but also there is good
reason to believe that they effectively serve to further cartelize the art
market.
In sum, the AAM and AAMD deaccessioning rules do not, cannot,
and should not prevent art museums from selling artworks from their
collection for socially beneficial purposes, including to cover operations
and capital expenses. They are not legally binding and are based on
“ethical” principles of dubious legitimacy. And in any case, they were
entirely irrelevant to the City’s ability to sell the DIA art.
B. The Best Interests of the Creditors
In both its oral and written opinions the bankruptcy court concluded
that the DIA settlement was in the best interests of the creditors, because
the City would not and should not sell the DIA art. The court observed that
the City refused to sell the DIA art at auction and make the proceeds
available to its creditors. And the court agreed with the City’s decision,
finding that the DIA was essential to the future of Detroit. The court was
correct on both counts.
Under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Act, a bankruptcy court hearing a
municipal bankruptcy action can only confirm or dismiss the municipality’s
plan of adjustment.159 It cannot modify the plan of adjustment or force the

159.

11 U.S.C. § 943 (2012).
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municipality to sell any municipal assets.
As a consequence, a
municipality’s plan of adjustment is in the best interest of the creditors and
should be affirmed by the bankruptcy court so long as it provides “a better
alternative for creditors than what they already have.” 160
The bankruptcy court correctly concluded that the City’s plan of
adjustment was in the best interests of the creditors, because it provided the
largest recovery the creditors could expect to receive. The court correctly
refused to consider the value of the DIA art in determining whether the
City’s plan of adjustment was in the best interest of the creditors, because
neither the creditors nor the court could force the City to sell the DIA art.
The value of the DIA art was irrelevant because the creditors were not
entitled to collect it.
Moreover, the City’s plan of adjustment was manifestly in the best
interests of the creditors, because it effectively gave them part of the value
of the DIA art, to which they were otherwise not entitled. As explained
above, while the court held that the City could not sell the DIA art, under
the DIA settlement, the City effectively sold the DIA art to the DIA
corporation, and used the proceeds to compensate its creditors. The court
correctly concluded that the DIA settlement and the plan of adjustment as a
whole were in the best interests of the creditors because they provided the
creditors with as much as they could reasonably expect to receive. “The
Court finds that the City has made reasonable efforts to monetize its assets
to satisfy the best interests of creditors test.” 161
Finally, the court correctly concluded that the DIA settlement was in
the best interests of the City as a whole. As the court observed, even if the
City could sell the DIA art, it should not do so.
However, even if the law did give the Court some authority here, the
Court would not have interfered with the City’s decision. The City
made the only appropriate decision. Maintaining the art at the DIA is
critical to the feasibility of the City’s plan and to the City’s future. . . .
To sell the DIA art would only deepen Detroit’s fiscal, economic and
social problems. To sell the DIA art would be to forfeit Detroit’s
162
future. The City made the right decision.

The DIA is one of the most important art museums in the United
States, if not the world. The bankruptcy court correctly concluded that the
City’s refusal to liquidate the DIA art was in the best interests of the City of
Detroit, and that the DIA settlement was in the best interests of the
creditors, given that it provided them with the largest recovery they could

160. In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 213 (2014) (citing In re Pierce Cnty. Hous.
Auth., 414 B.R. 702, 718 (2009)).
161. Id. at 219.
162. Id. at 218.
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expect, and arguably a larger recovery than that to which they were entitled
by law.
CONCLUSION
The bankruptcy court confirmed the City of Detroit’s plan of
adjustment and the DIA settlement because it found that the City could not,
would not, and should not sell the DIA. Its finding that the City could not
sell the DIA art was incorrect, but its recognition that the City would not
and should not sell the DIA art were correct and entirely adequate on their
own. Or rather, the bankruptcy court correctly recognized that the City was
entitled to monetize the DIA art on its own terms and consistent with the
best interests of the city, rather than simply liquidating the collection.
But the DIA settlement does not support the claim that museums
cannot deaccession artworks for the purpose of paying operating or capital
costs. In fact, it stands for the opposite. The City of Detroit did sell the
DIA art, and it sold the DIA art for the purpose of satisfying its debts.
Independent art museums ought to be able to do the same.

